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Abstract: This study investigates the long-term effects of national patent 
legislation and enforcement systems on the economic development of  
42 countries. The econometric methodology that has been adopted involves the 
estimation of three different models, namely, the pooled, the fixed effects and 
the random effects models whilst the specification of the economic 
development regressions is a variant of the standard growth specifications 
encountered in relevant studies. The empirical analysis is conducted in the 
context of the time period following the imposition of trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs). The results show that the extension and 
strengthening of patent legislation resulting from TRIPs have had a negative 
impact on economic development. In contrast, stronger levels of patent 
enforcement have had a positive effect overall and particularly for developing 
economies while negative for developed economies. 
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1 Introduction 
In terms of supporting economic development, should governments simply focus on the 
mere existence of patent legislation (‘law on the books’) or the degree of enforcement of 
this legislation (‘law in action’)?1 The debate over the effect of strengthening patent 
legislation and enforcement systems on the economic growth of developed and 
developing countries is now more topical than ever. Stronger patent legislation and 
enforcement can benefit patent-owning firms by enabling them to appropriate the 
economic returns from their investments in intangibles, such as on research and 
development (R&D) activities (Ceccagnoli, 2006; Kumar, 1996; Teece, 1986). 
Legislation that strengthens patent protection may increase litigation conflicts 
between firms operating in the same industries and, as a result, limit investment within an 
industry and discourage entrepreneurial activities by incumbent and prospective 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). In so doing, policy makers are regularly accused of 
serving the interests of powerful multinational enterprises (MNEs) at the expense of 
economic development, civil rights and prosperity (Maskus, 2000; Stiglitz, 2008). Is it 
therefore sensible and appropriate for governments to push for stronger patent legislation 
and enforcement whilst their associated effects on economic development and growth are 
uncertain and highly debatable? 
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Previous studies that have investigated the role of patent protection regulations on 
economic development and growth have analysed the years immediately after the signing 
of the TRIPs agreement (up to 1998) with only the study by Kim et al. (2012) reporting 
quinquennial evidence up to the year 2003. The results generally suggest a positive effect 
on economic development resulting from a strengthening of the levels of patent 
legislation (Falvey et al., 2006; Gould and Gruben, 1996; Schneider, 2005; Thompson 
and Rushing, 1996). However, when investigating the role of stronger patent legislation 
on the economic growth of developed and developing countries separately, the results 
become inconclusive (Kim et al., 2012; Schneider, 2005). Importantly, two decades after 
the TRIPs agreement, there is only limited evidence regarding the effect of strengthening 
patent legislation on the economic development of countries over time and any evidence 
that does exist is inconclusive. In as much as the relationship can be positive, it could also 
be negative or insignificant. Furthermore, given the changing global landscape in recent 
years, it is imperative that the impact of patent enforcement on economic development 
and growth is also appreciated since no evidence exists to date (Arora, 2009). 
This paper makes two novel contributions to the literature and current debate. First, 
we empirically investigate the longer-term effects of the TRIPs implementation on 
developing and developed countries, utilising a 14-year annual panel dataset.2 This 
allows us to investigate the effects of strengthening patent legislation levels on economic 
development during a timeframe when the TRIPs policies were implemented. This is a 
significant contribution since existing studies in the literature have mainly captured the 
pre-TRIPs or the first post-TRIPs years. We find that the strengthened levels of patent 
legislation and at times the over-strengthening of patent legislation have a negative effect 
on the economic development of countries. This finding challenges the results of 
previous studies but confirms the early conceptual work that was in full swing after 
TRIPs, which questioned the outcome of the all-embracing strengthening of patent 
legislation across the globe (Maskus, 2000; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). 
Secondly, this study examines for the first time, the effect of the enforcement aspect 
of the patent system on the economic development of countries. While patent 
enforcement is a significant component of the patent system, its effect on economic 
development has not been studied to date, mainly due to lack of available data providing 
a measure for patent enforcement (Arora, 2009; Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). In this 
study, we overcome the data availability problems by incorporating in our analysis a new 
index developed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) which accounts for the extent of patent 
enforcement. We find that strong patent enforcement has a positive effect on the 
economic development of countries generally and, most importantly, this effect is highly 
significant in the context of developing countries. In contrast, the effect of patent 
enforcement on developed economies is negative. This negative effect is perhaps not 
surprising given the escalation of patent litigation and enforcement cases within and 
between different industries and across a number of developed countries in recent years 
(Hall and Harhoff, 2012; Ziedonis, 2003). In summary, this paper is aimed at addressing 
the following critical question: Does the very existence of patent legislation support 
economic development or is it the degree of patent legislation enforcement that is the key 
driving force for economic development? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the background 
and the existing literature on the rationale of patent protection in relation to existing 
evidence on economic development. Section 3 sets out the methodological framework 
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used for the empirical investigation while Section 4 presents as well as links the results 
obtained to the existing evidence. The final section provides concluding remarks. 
2 Theoretical background 
Patent rights relate to the legal protection provided by countries to creators (both 
individuals and legal entities such as firms) of novel inventions relating to a product or a 
process, typically for a 20 year time period (WIPO, 2014). Rights over patents are 
granted by countries within their jurisdictions (and are shaped by international 
concordats) for two reasons: 
1  to provide legal protection to the moral and economic rights of creators and the 
rights of the public in general to access those creations 
2 to promote creativity and innovation (WIPO, 2014). 
Creators and owners of intangible assets are granted the right in law to determine who 
can and cannot use their creations (providing that appropriate fees, if applicable, are paid 
to the patent-owner). It is important to recognise that a patent is not a ‘monopoly’ right as 
such but rather, an exclusionary right which may be granted or not. In simple terms, a 
patent owner is not given the statutory right to commercially exploit anything but instead 
is allowed to prevent (or exclude) others from doing so. 
The patent system is comprised of two components, 
a the patent legislation 
b the enforcement related aspects of the legislation in practice (Papageorgiadis et al., 
2014; Yang and Sonmez, 2013). 
The existence of legal protection is generally expected to cover a broad spectrum of 
where patents can be allocated such as granting patents for inventions relating to 
pharmaceutical, chemical, agricultural and other products or processes (Ginarte and Park, 
1997). Patent legislation is also expected to include provisions for strict remedies when 
patent infringement takes place. This is because the patent system and its benefits for 
countries and firms can only be effective when compliance with the law is evident and 
ensured within a jurisdiction. While broadening and strengthening patent protection is 
considered beneficial, it may also escalate litigation conflicts within a country and 
increase the costs that firms face when operating in a market (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 
1998). Such conflicts will also increase the barriers to entry in the industry, deterring new 
or existing firms to compete in the market (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). 
Overall, the landscape of IP systems internationally and particularly the one for the 
patent system has changed significantly since the introduction of TRIPs (see UNCTAD, 
1996; WTO, 2013). The wide differences evidenced in the minimum standards of patent 
legislation before the TRIPs agreement have, by and large, been eradicated since most 
countries have fully implemented the requirements set by TRIPS (Taubman et al., 2012). 
Differences in terms of patent legislation are still apparent, particularly the ones 
regarding even stronger protection offered by a number of developed countries 
(Reichman and Dreyfuss, 2007). However, the basic minimum standards of patent 
legislation are in place enabling patent owners to register and seek protection for their 
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patent rights in both developed and developing countries. In contrast, the patent 
enforcement landscape is still in a state of flux with wide differences being evident across 
countries (Arora, 2009; Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). 
By signing the TRIPs agreement, the signatory parties of the treaty inadvertently 
created an experiment, where a large number of countries simultaneously agreed to 
accelerate the introduction of stronger standards for IP protection – despite the fact that 
some countries (developing) would not have been expected to adopt such measures 
independently (Maskus, 2000). This is because by the year 1994, the level of IP 
protection boasted by a particular country was very much dependent on its nation’s 
income and technological capabilities. The lower the national income and technological 
capability, the lower the legal protection of IP offered by the country in question 
(Maskus, 2000). This suggests that, in general terms, developed countries have tended to 
offer stronger levels of IP protection than developing. 
A number of studies have examined the effect of the very existence of patent 
legislation on economic development for the years prior to the TRIPs agreement. Studies 
focusing on the 1960–1994 period found that ‘stronger’ IP legislation has a significant 
effect on economic growth (Falvey et al., 2006; Gould and Gruben, 1996; Schneider, 
2005; Thompson and Rushing, 1996). ‘Stronger’ IP legislation is defined on the basis of 
the scope and depth of the patent legislation (for full details of the methodology see Park, 
2008). The results of these studies are consistent and significant across the different 
datasets studied, providing strong evidence towards the potential benefits of the TRIPs 
agreement in different years. Furthermore, Gould and Gruben (1996) find the positive 
effects of IP legislation to be stronger for more open than relatively closed economies. 
However, there is significant variation in the results when the datasets are divided into 
two groups, one for developed and one for developing countries. While Schneider (2005) 
finds a positive and significant relationship between IP legislation and economic growth 
for 47 countries, the strength of the relationship does not hold when the dataset is divided 
into developed and developing countries. IP is also found to have a positive effect on 
economic growth for high and low income countries, but no significant effect on middle 
income countries (Falvey et al., 2006). In addition, some studies looking at the same 
period find the existence of IP legislation to have a positive indirect effect on economic 
growth, by having a moderating effect on other variables. This was the case for the study 
by Thompson and Rushing (1999) who found that patent protection has a positive and 
significant relationship with total factor productivity, which in turn positively stimulates 
economic growth. This was the case only for developed economies, since the results for 
all other tests found an insignificant relationship. Furthermore, even though Park and 
Ginarte (1997) do not find IP legislation to directly stimulate economic growth, they find 
it to have a positive effect when combined with R&D activities in developed but not in 
developing countries. 
While the results from the literature prior to the signing and implementation of TRIPs 
are in relative agreement relating to the positive effects of the existence of IP legislation, 
there is only one study that uses more contemporary data. Kim et al. (2012) use a dataset 
for the years 1975–2003 (five year intervals) and find patent legislation to have a positive 
effect on economic growth in developed countries; however it has no effect on the growth 
of middle-low income countries. This result is in agreement with the previous literature 
and points towards the positive trajectory of strengthening IP legislation leading to 
economic growth. However, this effect has not been tested and confirmed by other 
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studies. Importantly, many developing countries have fully or partially fulfilled the 
requirements of the TRIPS agreement by the year 2005. 
In this section we have reviewed the literature on patent legislation in the context of 
pre and post-TRIPs agreement. There is no consensus in the literature concerning the 
positive or negative effect on economic development and growth arising from the mere 
existence of patent legislation (based on the Park, 2008 index methodology). We now 
turn in the following section to investigate the impact of patent legislation on economic 
development still further by providing a more in-depth analysis of the implications of 
patent legislation from two perspectives: 
a the mere existence of legislation (measured by Park, 2008) 
b the enforcement of patent legislation (measured by Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). 
3 Hypotheses, methodology and modelling framework 
3.1 Hypotheses 
As noted above, it is important to identify the effect that strengthening levels of patent 
legislation have on economic development. Here we explore this possible linkage by 
testing the following two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis relates to the mere existence of 
patent legislation and is expressed as follows: 
H1 Stronger levels of patent legislation in the period after the TRIPs agreement have had 
a positive effect on the economic development of both developed and developing 
countries. 
The rationale for stronger actual enforcement of patents is in line with the reasoning that 
led to the adoption of strengthening patent legislation measures put forward by TRIPs. 
Our second hypothesis investigates the impact of patent enforcement as follows: 
H2 Stronger levels of patent enforcement have had a positive effect on the economic 
development of both developed and developing countries. 
3.2 Methodology 
For the empirical investigation we develop a model – consisting of a dependent variable 
and a string of control variables - which is formulated and estimated for 42 countries over 
the period 1998–2011. The dataset used in the empirical investigation comprises both 
developed and developing economies. We initially provide estimates for the entire pool 
of countries in the dataset and then, on the basis of the size of their economies, we 
proceed with the estimation of models for two different clusters, i.e., developed and 
developing countries. 
In general, the model falls within the broad theoretical framework of economic 
development and growth determination but this time the emphasis is on the impact that 
the mere existence of patent legislation (based on Park, 2008) as well as on the extent of 
patent enforcement (based on Papageorgiadis et al., 2014) may have on economic 
development. 
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The 42 countries investigated are shown in Table 1 below, grouped according to 
developing (15) and developed (27) countries, as defined by the World Bank (2009).3 
Table 1 Countries included in the analysis 
Developing countries Developed countries 
1 Argentina 1 Australia 16 Japan 
2 Brazil 2 Austria 17 Korea (South) 
3 China 3 Belgium 18 Netherlands 
4 Colombia 4 Canada 19 New Zealand 
5 Hungary 5 Chile 20 Norway 
6 India 6 Czech Republic 21 Poland 
7 Indonesia 7 Denmark 22 Portugal 
8 Malaysia 8 Finland 23 Singapore 
9 Mexico 9 France 24 Spain 
10 Philippines 10 Germany 25 Sweden 
11 Russia 11 Greece 26 Switzerland 
12 South Africa 12 Hong Kong 27 UK 
13 Thailand 13 Ireland   
14 Turkey 14 Israel   
15 Venezuela 15 Italy   
Source: World Bank (2009) 
3.2.1 The variables 
The selection of variables used in this study is in line with the existing literature on 
economic growth and development theory (see for instance Li and Liu, 2005; Borensztein 
et al., 1998; Barro, 1991). More specifically, in the majority of the research studies 
published on the determinants of economic development and growth the dependent 
variable is proxied by the inclusion of GDP per capita growth and therefore this is the 
dependent variable in our models (Falvey et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2012; Park and Ginarte, 
1997; Schneider, 2005; Thompson and Rushing, 1996). 
As we stressed previously the focal point of this study is to measure the impact of 
patent legislation strength in terms of its mere existence, as well as the effect of patent 
enforcement on economic development. To do this, we incorporate into our models the 
Park (2008) index (of the existence of patent legislation) and the Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014) index (of patent enforcement) respectively. 
3.2.1.1 Existence of patent legislation index 
The Park (2008) index was first published by Ginarte and Park (1997) and provided 
quinquennial scores of patent legislation strength for 110 countries over the period  
1960–1990. It was subsequently updated by Park (2008) quinquennially up to and 
including the year 2005 with data on 122 countries. According to Park (2008, p.761) “this 
index was designed to provide an indicator of the strength of patent protection, not the 
quality of patent systems”. The index therefore measures patent legislation strength in 
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terms of the existence (or not) of a number of different laws in the legal systems of 
countries. Twenty laws or legal provisions are considered for the quantification of the 
index, grouped into five categories, namely: 
• patent coverage 
• membership of international treaties 
• enforcement mechanisms 
• restrictions on patent rights 
• duration of patent protection. 
The summated value of scores under each of the five categories comprises the final index 
measured along a scale of 0–5, with higher values signifying stronger levels of patent 
legislation. 
3.2.1.2 Strength of patent enforcement index 
The Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) composite index measures the strength of national 
patent systems by focusing on the effectiveness of enforcement practices in conjunction 
with the overall administrative functioning of the system. This new index follows the 
theoretical underpinnings of transaction cost theory and estimates the level of transaction 
costs that patent owning firms face when engaging with a national patent system. A 
country’s score is the aggregate of three transaction costs constructs, namely: 
• servicing costs 
• property rights protection costs 
• monitoring costs. 
The higher the score of a country, the easier it is for a firm to enforce its patent rights and 
vice versa. 
3.2.1.3 Other independent variables 
We incorporate six control variables in our model which are used widely in the economic 
development and growth literature, namely: 
a gross capital formation 
b government stability 
c FDI flows 
d human capital 
e inflation rate 
f investments in R&D (Kim et al., 2012; Park and Ginarte, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). 
Gross capital formation is commonly found to be a significant parameter in the 
determination of growth in the majority of economic development and growth models 
since an increase in the capital stock is needed to promote economic activity, which in 
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turn stimulates economic growth (Barro, 2003; Mankiw et al., 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; 
World Bank, 1989). In our model we use gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP and therefore expect this variable to be positively related to growth. Government 
stability is commonly expected to provide the necessary supporting conditions that enable 
economic growth (Barro, 1991, 2003). We use the government stability data developed 
by the PRS Group (2013) and provided in the international country risk guide (ICRG) 
and anticipate higher levels of political stability to have a positive relationship with 
economic growth. FDI flows are included in our model since they are widely expected to 
generate positive spillover effects for the host economies and therefore positively affect 
economic growth (Borensztein et al., 1998; Li and Liu, 2005; Lipsey, 2002). In order to 
control for the anticipated positive effects that high quality human capital can have on the 
economic growth of a country (especially for developing countries), we use data on 
national school enrolment in tertiary education in our model and expect this variable to 
bear a positive sign (Awokuse and Yin, 2010; Gould and Grouben, 1996; Mankiw et al., 
1992). We also use the inflation rate as a proxy for the economic stability within a 
country and anticipate a negative relationship with economic growth (Barro, 2003). 
Finally, investments in R&D can positively affect economic growth. In our model, we use 
data on the number of R&D researchers per million population to account for R&D 
investments and anticipate a positive relationship with economic growth (Park & Ginarte, 
1997). 
3.3 Modelling framework 
This subsection considers the empirical determinants of economic development using a 
sample of 42 countries, covering a broad range of experience from developing to 
developed countries. The number of countries investigated is constrained by data 
availability relating to the patent legislation and enforcement indices.4 
The econometric methodology that has been adopted involves the estimation of panel 
models along the lines suggested by Baltagi (2013). The empirical specification of the 
economic development regressions is a variant of the standard growth specifications 
encountered in relevant studies (see for instance Barro, 2003). 
We start by using a general-to-specific approach on the basis of which we simplify an 
initial general model that adequately characterises the empirical evidence within our 
theoretical framework. 
The dataset used spans the period 1998 to 2011, consisting of N cross-sectional units, 
denoted i = 1, …, N observed at T time periods, denoted t = 1, …, T. More specifically, y 
is a (TN × 1) vector of endogenous variables, x is a (TN × k) matrix of exogenous 
variables, which does not include a column of units for the constant term. In this context, 
we collated data for a cross section of 42 developed and developing countries (N = 42), 
over a period of 14 years (T = 14). In passing, it should be stressed that after estimating 
equations using the entire dataset, we then, on the basis of the size of the economies, split 
the dataset into two groups, thus generating a cluster with 15 developed countries and a 
cluster with 27 developing countries. 
The generic linear econometric form of the model utilised can be expressed as 
follows: 
,it i i it ity x ε= + +α β  (1) 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   632 N. Papageorgiadis et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
( )2. . . 0,it iε i i d σ∼  
where yit is the dependent variable, αi is the intercept term, βi is a k × 1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated by the explanatory variables, and xit is a 1 × k vector of 
observations on the explanatory variables, t = 1, …, T, i = 1, …, N, and εit is a random 
term, assumed to satisfy the normal requirements. 
We distinguish three cases of equation (1): 
3.3.1 The pooled model 
When both α and β are common between regions, we get the pooled model: 
,y ι X ε= + +α β  (2) 
where ι is a (TN × 1) column vector of ones. For this simple model, the generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimator reduces to pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). 
3.3.2 The fixed effects model 
The fixed effects (or least squares dummy variables model, or within model) is based on 
the notion that differences across countries can be captured in differences in the constant 
term: 
,it i it ity x ε′= + +α β  (3) 
The fixed effects model is a reasonable approach when we can be confident that the 
differences between countries can be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression 
function. Equations (2) and (3) are restricted versions of the general model (1) while (2) 
is a restricted form of equation (3). Under the assumption that the εit are independently 
normally distributed over i and t with mean zero and variance 2 ,εσ  F-statistics can be 
used to test the linear restrictions postulated by equations (2) and (3). 
3.3.3 The random effects model 
In the event when sampled cross sectional units are drawn from a large population, it may 
be more appropriate to use the random effects model (or variance components model), in 
which individual constant terms are randomly distributed across cross sectional units: 
,it it i ity x μ ε′= + + +α β  (4) 
where E(μi = 0), 2 2( ) ,μiE μ σ=  E(μiμj) = 0 for i ≠ j, and E(εit μj) = 0, for all i, t, and j. Thus 
μi is a random disturbance which characterises the ith observation and is constant through 
time; it can be regarded as a collection of factors that are specific to region i and are not 
included in the regression. The above model can be estimated by GLS. 
Given the preceding theoretical exposition in conjunction with equation (1) apart 
from the main determinants of growth, we primarily seek to isolate and effectively gauge 
the impact of two variables relating to the existence of patent legislation (using the Park, 
2008 index) and patent enforcement strength (using the Papageorgiadis et al., 2014 
index). In doing so, we estimate various specifications of model (1). The explicit form of 
the final model to be estimated is expressed as follows: 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8
it it it it it it it
it it it
gdpcc a a gcf a fdi a rd a hc a inf a gvs
a pl a pe ε
= + + + + + +
+ + +  (5) 
it i itε v u= +  
where gdppc is GDP per capita, gcf denotes gross capital formation to GDP ratio, fdi is 
foreign direct investment flows as percentage of GDP, rd stands for research and 
development, hc is human capital, inf is inflation rate, gvs denotes government stability, 
pl is the Park (2008) index of the existence of patent legislation, pe is the Papageorgiadis 
et al. (2014) index of patent enforcement strength, εt is the disturbance term, vi captures 
the unobserved country-specific effect while uit is the idiosyncratic error. This is a  
one-way error component regression model, where vi ~ IIN (0, σ2) and independent of  
uit ~ IIN (0, σ2). The natural logarithm of each variable was used. The definitions as well 
as the descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2 Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Max. Min. 
gdpcc GDP per capita growth (annual, %) 3.1 3.6 13.6 –13.1 
gcf Gross fixed capital formation/GDP (%) 23.3 6.5 48.6 10.9 
gvs Government stability (ICRG, index 0–12) 8.9 1.5 12 5.1 
fdi FDI net inflows (in $bn) 117.6 156.0 321.3 7.3 
hc Gross enrolment ratio1 (%) 52.11 20.54 103.87 6.19 
inf Inflation rate (consumer price index, % p.a.) 8.3 11.9 85.7 –4.1 
rd Researchers in R&D per million of population. 2555 1844 8007 49 
pl Patent legislation strength (Park, 2008, index 0–5) 3.9 0.6 4.7 1.2 
pe Patent enforcement strength (Papageorgiadis et al., 
2014, index 0–10) 
6.5 2.1 9.9 2.5 
Note: 1Gross enrolment ratio (GER): is the total enrolment in tertiary education 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year 
age group following on from secondary school leaving. GER can exceed 100% due 
to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late 
school entrance and grade repetition (World Bank, 2014b). 
Source: Data on patent legislation and patent enforcement were sourced 
directly from the published work of Park (2008) and Papageorgiadis 
et al. (2014) respectively. Government stability data originate from 
the international country risk guide (ICRG) developed by the PRS 
Group (2013). The World Bank open data website of the World Bank 
(2014c) was the source for the data for all other variables used in the 
estimation. 
All estimated models were subjected to a series of rigorous testing for robustness. More 
specifically, the White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator with ordinary 
least squares estimation was used to ensure that the standard errors are robust. Then the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity was employed in an attempt to 
identify and effectively address potential limitations in the model (for a more 
comprehensive analysis on the application of the DWH test, see Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). 
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Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) as well as the cross correlation 
matrix suggested that existing collinear relationships were kept to a minimum as the 
average VIF score was 3.6 when a common rule of thumb is that VIF scores higher that 
10 may constitute a legitimate cause for concern (Kutner et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2007).5 
4 Results 
In this section we set out and discuss the results for the entire dataset as well as for the 
clusters of developed and developing countries separately. We estimate three different 
models, namely the pooled, fixed effects and random models. On the basis of the 
selection criteria (i.e., F-test, Hausman and LM tests), the model that turns out to be the 
most legitimate and therefore the one that the interpretation of the results will be based 
upon is the fixed effects model in all three different data sets respectively. 
Table 3 provides the estimation results for the entire dataset. Similarly, Table 4 
reports the estimation results for the cluster of the developed economies in the sample 
and Table 5 presents the findings of the regression models for the group of the 
developing economies. 
Table 3 Growth regression estimates for entire dataset - with robust (HAC) standard errors 
(dependent variable: GDP per capita growth) 
All countries 
Explanatory variables Pooled model coefficient (std. error) 
Fixed effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
Random effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
GCF 0.23 (0.06)*** 0.44 (0.06)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 
Government stability 0.09 (0.05)* 0.06 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03) 
FDI  0.02 (0.01)** 0.01 (0.007)* 0.02 (0.007)*** 
Human capital 0.04 (0.01)** 0.09 (0.05)** 0.04 (0.02)** 
inflation rate –0.02 (0.008)* –0.08 (0.07) –0.01 (0.01) 
R&D –0.0003 (0.01) 0.08 (0.06) 0.0003 (0.01) 
Patent legislation –0.12 (0.06)* –0.08 (0.007)* 0.08 (0.05)* 
Patent enforcement 0.09 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.13)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 
Const. –0.87 (0.14)*** - - 
R2 0.54 0.57 0.58 
Hausman (X2)a 54.85 [0.00]   
F-test (FE = 0)b 1.510 [0.04]   
Breusch-Paganc 2.58 [0.107]   
Notes: aSelection test indicating that the FE model is preferred to the RE one. 
bTests the joint significance of the fixed effects estimates – FE is preferred to PM. 
cAn LM test used in the selection between the PM and the RE model – PM is 
preferred. 
*, ** and ***denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
p-values are given in the square brackets. 
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Table 4 Growth regression estimates for the group of developed economies in the cluster – 
with robust (HAC) standard errors (dependent variable: GDP per capita growth) 
Developed 
Explanatory variables Pooled model coefficient (std. error) 
Fixed effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
Random effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
GCF 0.11 (0.015) 0.23 (0.09)** 0.19 (0.10)** 
Government stability 0.23 (0.21) 0.03 (0.18) 0.13 (0.12) 
FDI  0.01 (0.01) 0.004 (0.006) 0.06 (0.05) 
Human capital 0.07 (0.04)* 0.13 (0.06)** 0.13 (0.07)** 
inflation rate 0.02 (0.01)* –0.24 (0.23) –0.19 (0.16) 
R&D –0.05 (0.005) 0.01 (0.02) 0.08 (0.06) 
Patent legislation 0.005 (0.11) 0.04 (0.16) 0.05 (0.18) 
Patent enforcement  –0.009 (0.04) –0.32 (0.18)* –0.36 (0.16)** 
Const. 0.53 (0.28)* - - 
R2 0.47 0.52 0.53 
Hausman (X2)a 23.42 [0.00]   
F-test (FE = 0)b 19.65 [0.00]   
Breusch-Paganc 31.60 [0.00]   
Notes: aSelection test indicating that the FE model is preferred to the RE one. 
bTests the joint significance of the fixed effects estimates – FE is preferred to RE. 
cAn LM test used in the selection between the PM and the RE model – RE is 
preferred. 
*, ** and ***denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
p-values are given in the square brackets. 
As shown in Table 3, the explanatory power of the most preferred model, i.e., the fixed 
effects model, reflected by the coefficient of determination R2, is satisfactory suggesting 
that 57% of the variation in the dependent variable is effectively explained by variations 
in the independent variables as a whole. The coefficients of patent legislation strength 
and patent enforcement strength are found to be statistically significant at the 10% and 
1% levels of significance respectively – but it is worth commenting on the difference of 
the signs that the two variables bear. In particular, patent legislation strength as measured 
by the Park (2008) index is found to be negatively signed and moderately significant. 
This suggests that economic development is adversely affected by the strengthening of 
patent legislation. 
This negative relationship is found to be moderately significant in the regressions 
covering the entire dataset but found to be insignificant for the split datasets based on the 
developed and developing countries alone. Therefore the results obtained for the entire 
dataset reject H1 since stronger levels of patent legislation in the period after the TRIPs 
agreement are found to have a negative effect on the economic growth and development 
of countries. This is a controversial but important finding. After the TRIPs agreement, the 
signatory countries reformed their statutory patent legislation provisions and strengthened 
them in order to boost competition and increase economic activity. The evidence suggests 
that the strengthening of patent legislation had a negative rather than a positive effect on 
the economic development of the reforming countries. While in the past countries 
adapting stronger legal protection of patents enjoyed higher levels of economic 
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development, this is not at all evident in the post TRIPs era. In fact, stronger patent 
legislation is more likely to have a counterproductive effect on the economic growth of a 
country. This may be due to the sudden push for stronger levels of patent legislation 
across the board of all TRIPs signatory countries, when in the past countries 
strengthening their patent legislation differed from others and were able to attract and 
retain higher levels of economic activity. This result challenges the findings of earlier 
studies using data from the years before or immediately after the signing and 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement, which found stronger levels of patent protection 
to positively affect economic growth, especially for developed countries (Falvey et al., 
2006; Kim et al., 2012; Thompson and Rushing, 1996; Schneider, 2005). 
Table 5 Growth regression estimates for the group of developing economies in the cluster with 
robust (HAC) standard errors (dependent variable: GDP per capita growth) 
Developing 
Explanatory variables Pooled model coefficient (std. error) 
Fixed effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
Random effects 
coefficient (std. error) 
GCF 0.24 (0.08)*** 0.51(0.10)*** 0.24 (0.08)*** 
Government stability 0.29 (0.11)*** 0.16 (0.09)* 0.29 (0.10)*** 
FDI  0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02)* 0.03 (0.03) 
Human capital 0.08 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.07) 1.14 (0.15)*** 
Inflation rate –0.01(0.02) –0.34 (0.33) –0.62 (0.60) 
R&D 0.03 (0.02) 0.23 (0.20) 0.45(0.41) 
Patent legislation 0.29(0.14)** 0.12(0.11) –0.29 (0.14)** 
Patent enforcement  0.02 (0.09) 0.48 (0.19)** 0.02 (0.09) 
Const. –1.76(0.42)*** - - 
R2 0.49 0.51 0.51 
Hausman(X2)a 38.82 [0.00]   
F-test (FE = 0)b 14.52 [0.00]   
Breusch-Paganc 60.6 12.61 [0.00]   
Notes: aSelection test indicating that the FE model is preferred to the RE one. 
bTests the joint significance of the fixed effects estimates – FE is preferred to RE. 
cAn LM test used in the selection between the PM and the RE model – RE is 
preferred. 
*, ** and ***denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
p-values are given in the square brackets. 
However, our study confirms the findings of previous conceptual studies in terms of 
patent legislation having an insignificant effect on the economic development of 
developing countries. While the push for stronger patent legislation levels prior to TRIPs 
was justified and based on solid past evidence, the results of our study cast doubt on 
whether or not such an approach should be pursued further. This has important 
implications for policy makers as well as for business investment decisions. On the one 
hand, developing countries have no incentive to extend and adopt stronger levels of 
patent legislation since allocating time and resources on patent protection reforms will 
not increase the likelihood of achieving growth. In contrast, they can focus the time and 
resources allocated to reforms on other aspects of their institutions such as improving the 
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quality and availability of human capital which is found to induce economic 
development. On the other hand, as the evidence of this study suggests that even if a 
developing country decides to invest its efforts on the strengthening of patent legislation, 
their reformed patent protection legislation is more likely to have a negative effect on 
economic growth. This is because the adoption of rigid and inflexible legislative 
frameworks may well discourage business activity and act as an impediment to economic 
growth. A more sensible policy recommendation therefore would be to modernise and 
simplify the existing, strong patent legislation framework so that it once again provides 
confidence and certainty to its users (Hargreaves, 2011). 
In contrast, strengthening levels of patent enforcement are found to have a positive 
and highly significant relationship with the economic development regressions for the 
entire dataset. This relationship remains positive and significant when considering the 
developing countries’ cluster dataset but turns into a moderately negative relationship for 
the developed economies’ dataset. On the basis of the entire dataset and developing 
countries’ cluster, we fail to reject the second hypothesis as we have clear evidence that 
stronger levels of patent enforcement do indeed positively influence the economic 
development of countries, especially developing ones. In contrast, we reject the second 
hypothesis with regards to the results for the dataset concerning the developed countries. 
These are significant findings as this is the first study that empirically tests the longer 
term effect of patent enforcement on economic development. As the patent systems of 
countries that are signatory to the TRIPs agreement have evolved and the level of patent 
legislation has been strengthened to a point where relative harmonisation is achieved 
across minimum patent protection regulations, the actual enforcement of these laws in 
practice becomes the crucial ingredient that enables or deters countries to achieve 
economic growth. Especially in a developing country context, strong levels of 
enforcement can reassure the patent owners that once their patent is granted, they can 
seek for and achieve effective enforcement in actual practice should that be required in 
the event that patent infringement occurs. However, the actual enforcement of rigid and 
inflexible legislative frameworks of developed countries may discourage business 
activity and act as an impediment to economic growth. 
The results presented here clearly demonstrate that while previous studies in the 
literature have considered patent protection in terms of the mere existence of the law 
only, this paper provides strong evidence to suggest that the enforcement related aspects 
of the patent system are those which positively affect the economic development of 
countries. The importance of patent enforcement should be highlighted and included in 
the policy recommendations helping to stimulate economic growth in a country. We 
would argue that all countries, particularly developing ones, can potentially benefit from 
stronger levels of patent enforcement. This suggests that developing countries can 
embrace the policies towards the strengthening of patent enforcement that are currently 
under negotiation at an international level since these are expected to have a positive 
effect on their economic development. While the regression for the cluster of developed 
countries shows patent enforcement to have a moderately negative effect on economic 
development, this may be due to stronger levels of patent enforcement being applied to 
enforce highly stringent legislative frameworks as achieved by developed economies 
after the TRIPs agreement (Papageorgiadis et al., 2013, 2014). Developed economies that 
push for reforms to strengthen patent enforcement therefore need to also incorporate 
policies for the modernisation and simplification of patent legislation frameworks 
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internationally, so that they can also positively affect (and not deter) their economic 
development progress. 
As far as the emerging relationships between the dependent and the rest of the control 
variables are concerned, an inspection of the most preferred model (the fixed effects 
model) suggests that gross capital formation, human capital investment and FDI flows 
bear the expected signs and have a significant positive relationship with economic growth 
(see Table 3). Similar estimation results are also obtained for the dataset that corresponds 
to the developed economies, albeit FDI flows become insignificant (Table 4). 
Furthermore, the evidence generated for the developing economies suggest that apart 
from the gross capital formation and human capital variables, government stability is also 
found to have a positive relationship with economic growth (Table 5). 
5 Concluding remarks 
This paper empirically reveals a new perspective regarding the role of the strength of 
patent legislation and patent enforcement in stimulating economic development during 
the post-TRIPs years and raises important considerations regarding future policy making 
activities promoting stronger patent systems. In recent decades, a series of lengthy policy 
negotiations between developed and developing countries have been held, aimed at 
reducing trade barriers and increasing international business activity and higher rates of 
economic growth. One of the institutional contexts requiring reforms commonly included 
in multilateral negotiations relates to the strengthening of patent systems, with the most 
significant milestone being set with the signing of the TRIPs agreement in 1994. Many 
previous studies have investigated the effect of patent legislation levels in the years prior 
to or immediately after the TRIPs agreement, finding strengthening levels of patent 
legislation to have a positive effect on a country’s economic growth. The study reported 
here contributes to the existing literature by investigating: 
a the longer term impact of strengthening patent legislation after TRIPs for the years 
1998–2011 
b for the first time, the effect of patent enforcement on the economic development of 
countries. 
The results indicate that for the 42 countries studied strengthened levels of patent 
legislation in the years after TRIPs have had a negative effect on economic growth of the 
countries in our sample. The results challenge the conventional wisdom that 
strengthening the patent related legislative framework has beneficial economic outcomes 
for the reforming countries. This is because the global context of patent protection 
legislation has experienced drastic changes during the implementation of the TRIPs 
requirement. Prior to TRIPs, countries (mainly developed) reformed and strengthened 
their patent systems on an ad-hoc basis. After TRIPs, patent regulations changed in a 
uniform and speedy manner. Any positive effects in terms of becoming more attractive 
investment destinations compared to other countries disappeared. Especially in developed 
economies, MNEs were able to extend their patent protection in international markets in a 
monopolistic (at times) manner, making it more difficult for other companies to compete 
in an industry. A characteristic example of this behaviour is the patent wars in the 
telecommunications industry which discourage new and existing companies to compete 
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in the market for fear of being sued and entering a lengthy legal battle over patent 
infringement. The results raise strong concerns regarding the continued emphasis in 
strengthening levels of patent legislation since the effect may be positive for strong 
global MNEs, while the effect on the overall economy may be negative. This is especially 
the case for developing countries that are the recipients of strong diplomatic pressures 
and, at the same time, are the ones where the national economic concerns tend to be 
stronger. 
In contrast, strengthening levels of patent enforcement have a positive effect on 
economic development and this is particularly the case for the developing countries in the 
sample. The effect of stronger enforcement on the growth of developed economies is 
however negative, as this often relates to the even more rigid and inflexible legislative 
frameworks that have evolved in developed economies in the years after the TRIPs 
agreement. This is the first empirical study of the role of patent enforcement in 
stimulating economic growth. The results are aligned with the shift in the attention of 
policy negotiations in recent years whereby some countries are now pushing for the 
adoption of stronger levels of patent enforcement by developing countries rather than 
focusing on the adoption of stronger laws per se. Furthermore, the results provide policy 
makers with a clear indication that such reforms can benefit the developing countries 
adopting them. However, it is important to highlight that while the results concerning the 
role of patent enforcement provide a positive outlook, policy makers should be cognisant 
that these results relate to a time period (1998–2011) when the changes in the institutional 
contexts of countries mainly focused on the existence of patent legislation rather than 
patent enforcement. If policy makers push for the adoption of patent enforcement on a 
widespread TRIPs style scale, the implications may have negative effects on longer term 
economic development across some countries. This is unlikely to be an attractive 
proposition for countries, particularly those at the lower end of the economic 
development scale. 
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Notes 
1 The World Bank (2014a) defines economic development as a “qualitative change and 
restructuring in a country’s economy in connection with technological and social progress”. 
2 Covering the period 1998–2011. 
3 The World Bank (2009) classification was used for this categorization. This is based on gross 
national income (GNI) per capita data. Developed countries are those with a GNI per capita 
figure in excess of $11,905. Countries with a smaller figure (i.e., low income, lower middle 
income and upper middle income countries) are considered collectively to be developing 
countries. 
4 While the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index provides data for 48 countries, the usable data for 
the timeframe considered in this study was restricted to 42 countries only. 
5 The cross correlation matrix is not presented due to space limitations, however it can be 
provided on request. 
